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Abstract This paper examines conditions and structures that led to abuses in the American
mutual fund industry. The scandals unfolded in 2003 when a whistleblower alerted
authorities to illegal and unethical trading practices between institutional investors and
mutual fund companies. The abuses included late trading, market timing, illegal sales
practices, and excessive fees, with damages estimated at well over US $4 billion per year.
While this scandal involved American companies, there are indications that other countries
could be at risk of similar wrongdoing. Archival data are used to understand the regulatory
conditions that allowed for illegal practices to proliferate throughout the American mutual
fund industry. These conditions are compared to those in Japan to assess the potential for
similar abuses and how they might best be prevented.
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The mutual fund industry is a popular destination for many Americans’ retirement savings.
Within the past decade, it was embroiled in a widespread scandal that involved the
industry’s most recognizable names and that resulted in over US $4 billion in fines. This
paper examines how increased competition among firms, lack of transparency in financial
transactions, conflicts of interest in mutual fund governance, and traditions of commerce
created a crime-facilitative environment (Needleman and Needleman 1979) in the mutual
fund industry that resulted in the scandal. While the offenses involved American
companies, foreign financial markets have comparable institutional structures, making
them easily susceptible to similar abuses. In order to understand the risk to foreign markets,
the concept of a mutual fund and its purpose will be explained, followed by a discussion of
the scandal’s crime-facilitative structures to see how they allowed and encouraged trading
abuses in the industry. Finally, the paper will consider these issues in the context of Japan, a
country with one of the world’s largest mutual fund industries, in order to assess the
potential for a similar scandal to occur there.
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Mutual Funds: An Overview
A mutual fund is a financial instrument comprised of a collection of stocks, bonds, or other
investments. Mutual funds are priced at the end of each trading day, rather than in real time,
as each individual fund investment can vary second-by-second, causing the mutual fund
price to change a great deal from one moment to the next. At the close of the market, when
securities have stopped trading, the fund’s price is calculated using closing prices from
individual securities that comprise the portfolio. The closing prices are combined and
averaged according to each security’s ratio to the overall fund portfolio. The net mutual
fund purchases or sales are also figured into the fund’s value, which is divided by the
number of outstanding shares to determine the fund’s price. This price is typically set just
after 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (Potts 1972).
The etiology of mutual funds has been as a long-term “buy and hold” investment. Short-
term investments in mutual funds hurt long-term investors because they skim profits from
the fund. When a mutual fund manager invests, he or she places percentages of investors’
assets in different securities and a certain amount is kept in cash. The amount of cash
retained in a fund eliminates the risk of losing the whole portfolio’s value due to market
volatility. Cash can also be used to pay investors who sell their shares. When investors
rapidly trade in and out of a fund, more cash is withdrawn to pay them. Also, the increased
number of transactions can force the mutual fund to have to buy or sell stocks to
accommodate its varying pool of money. Each transaction creates commissions that the
fund must pay. These costs either come directly out of the fund’s profits or they are passed
along to the investor in the form of fees (Wall Street Journal 1999). In addition, these
conditions may force a fund manager to make transactions at a loss on their investment,
further hurting the fund’s potential performance.
The Mutual Fund Industry in the US
The first modern mutual fund appeared in 1924 when the Massachusetts Investment Trust
created a fund open to outside investors. The fund started with approximately two hundred
investors and US $50,000 in assets (Bogle 2005). After the 1929 stock market crash and the
Great Depression, the securities industry underwent numerous changes, including creation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee the industry. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 regulated the mutual fund industry by requiring all funds to register
with the SEC and meet standards of operation, disclosure, and securities transactions, which
had been absent until this period (Russell 2007). The Investment Company Act of 1940 did
not alter the old method of pricing mutual funds. Under the Act, “backward pricing,” which
allowed investors to make trades at the previous day’s price was still employed. This
pricing loophole was corrected in 1968 when Rule 22c-1 was adopted by the SEC, making
forward pricing the standard (Sterngold 1994). Forward pricing requires that mutual fund
trades be conducted in the next calculated price.
In 2003, former SEC commissioner Harvey Goldschmidt stated, “The mutual fund
industry has been blessed—and blessed is the only word—by being relatively free of
scandal” (Bogle 2005). That statement that had been true since the Investment Company
Act was passed almost 70 years earlier. By the end of 2003, endemic late trading and
market timing for preferred clients sullied the industry’s former clean record. Those
involved in the scandals reads like a who’s who of American finance: Bank of America,
Bank One, Deutsche Bank, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Smith Barney, Charles Schwab,
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Janus, Fidelity, Putnam, and Strong Funds, all of whom had engaged in some degree of
illegal mutual fund trading.
Scandal Among US Mutual Funds
In October of 2002, Noreen Harrington, a former executive with the investment arm of the
Stern family fortune, which included Canary Capital Partners hedge fund, contacted the
New York Attorney General’s office. She had overheard brokers bragging that the hedge
fund was illegally trading their mutual fund investments. By the summer of 2003, the
Attorney General’s office had issued subpoenas for Canary Capital Partners, and Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer began a broader investigation into the mutual fund industry. He
discovered that various hedge funds had been market timing and late trading with the
assistance of brokerage firms that placed the mutual fund orders and third party firms that
processed the orders (see Appendix 1) (Elkind 2004).
Cooperation from former employees buttressed the case against Canary Capital Partners.
Canary’s owner, Eddie Stern, quickly reached a settlement with Spitzer’s office and became
their star witness, pinpointing different players involved in the scandal (Elkind 2004). As
news of the investigation became public, the media began to discuss a scandal in the former
“scandal-free” industry.
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the SEC launched their own
investigation into the mutual fund industry, joining forces with Spitzer and other state
Attorney Generals. The joint investigation led to ten criminal convictions, over 60
settlements, mutual fund executives and traders being fired and banned from the securities
industry, rule changes from the regulatory agencies, and more than US $4 billion in fines.
Late Trading and Market Timing
The integrity of the forward pricing system is supposed to be guaranteed by time-stamping
tickets as orders are received at brokerage firms. Orders are then passed along to a third
party to be processed. The backlog of orders results in many trades placed before the
4:00 p.m. deadline being completed hours later. The system is violated when certain
customers are allowed to place orders after the market closes, buying or selling their mutual
funds at an already determined price. The other manner of late trading involves a brokerage
firm colluding with certain privileged investors to place legitimate mutual fund orders when
information that is expected to affect the mutual fund’s price will be released after the
market’s close. The order is processed only if the information would benefit the investor. If
the investor would not benefit, the order is canceled (see Appendix 1). Spitzer characterized
these practices as “betting on a horse race after the horses have crossed the finish line”
(Media Center 2003). The practice is similar to insider trading in that it eliminates
investment risk, victimizes investors through preferential treatment given to a privileged
few, and destroys integrity and trust in the financial markets.
The practice of late trading has been outlawed by the Martin Act—a New York State
securities law enacted in 1921 and commonly used to prosecute bogus stock sales and
boiler room establishments—and by the Federal Investment Act of 1940 (McTamaney
2003). Late trading is unique to mutual funds because they are priced only at the close of
the market and have this forward pricing policy that requires that orders be processed after
the market has already closed.
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Despite its prohibition, a study of late trading discovered that the practice was prevalent
in the industry. A sample found evidence of late trading in 39 of 66 mutual fund families.
Based upon late trading levels in the sample, it is estimated that late trading costs other
investors approximately US $400 million per year (Zitzewitz 2006).
Late trading alone does not guarantee a profit for investors. They ensure a profit only if
the investor1 is able to make a late purchase after hearing good news about a company or
sector and then sell the mutual fund the next day. This way they make their purchase at a
price that does not include the good news and sell the fund after the good news adds to its
price. This type of rapid in–out trading often associated with late trading is known as
market timing2.
While the SEC does not expressly outlaw market timing in mutual funds, it is considered
unethical because of its negative effects on long-term investors. In addition, each mutual
fund prospectus states that the fund does not allow market timing. By allowing it, a fund is
misrepresenting its position on the issue and defrauding its customers by contradicting
statements from the prospectus. Therefore, the offense lies not in allowing market timing,
but in lying to their customers through the prospectus.
Funds also have created disincentives to market timing through fees or bans for short-
term investors. In this scandal, certain customers were exempted from these penalties and
the fund company explicitly or implicitly condoned their market timing by agreeing to
allow the activity or by not pursuing those blatantly breaking the rules. In fact, David
Brown of the New York Attorney General’s office discovered form-letter contracts between
mutual fund companies and market timers (Sterngold 1994). This represents another case of
disconnect between the organizations’ stated rules and their practices as well as preferential
treatment afforded investors of a certain status.
Estimates suggest that market timers have cost long-term investors over US $4 billion
per year since 1998–1999, the year when market timing was most popular (Zitzewitz 2003).
Some fund companies began to crack down on market timers. Recovered emails from the
case against Prudential show that some mutual fund companies had tried to stop all trading
by Prudential’s market timing brokers (Thomas 2006). Other mutual funds had asked
brokerage firms and traders to cease and desist market timing in their funds. In response,
traders attempted to disguise the practice by changing account names and splitting large
trades into several smaller ones to avoid detection.
The motivation for mutual fund companies to allow late trading and market timing is
based in their compensation scheme. A mutual fund manager is paid a percentage of the
total assets invested in the fund. The theory behind this practice is similar to free market
theories in that the best performing funds will attract the most money, rewarding these
managers for their high returns. In this case, hedge funds and other institutional investors
subverted the spirit of the incentive by investing large amounts in the mutual fund—maybe
tens of millions of dollars—with the understanding that this investment would be long term
and would allow the fund manager to substantially increase his or her “assets under
management.” In exchange for the large investment, the mutual fund manager would allow
the investor to use a smaller account, perhaps one to five million dollars, to late trade and
1 In this case, “investor” can mean lay persons investing their own money, or the broker investing on behalf
of clients.
2 Market timing is an investment strategy that attempts to capitalize on short-term price fluctuations and is
not always associated with late trading. It may be utilized with various types of securities and may be both
legal and ethical depending upon the type of security that is traded.
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market time (Elkind 2004). This way, both parties benefit, while average investors lose by
realizing reduced profits or increased losses from their investment.
Investors do not necessarily need to collude with a mutual fund to engage in market
timing and many market timers practiced their strategy in spite of the fund’s best efforts to
prevent illegal trades. The problem with prevention comes because market timers are
detected only after they have already made a number of trades. This issue is compounded
because of difficulties in monitoring a large number of accounts and the lack of
transparency in mutual fund transactions (Henriques 2004). Because each mutual fund
company is exclusively responsible for detecting market timing and enforcing its stated
policies, a fund faces a loss of business if it prevents an investor from market timing while
another fund allows it. The investor may transfer assets to the second company. Allowing
mutual funds to enforce their own market timing rules may give them flexibility to make
exceptions based upon the circumstances of each case, but it also creates a conflict of
interest which may create lax enforcement of these policies.
Factors in the US Scandal
Rapid Growth of the Stock Market and Mutual Fund Industries
In 1952 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) conducted its first census and found that
almost 6.5 million Americans, or about 4% of the population, owned common stock (Geisst
2000). At this time, the stock market had an average volume of 1.3 million shares traded
daily. This represented a return of confidence in the markets for the first time since the
Great Depression, and investment advice was occasionally found in newspapers and
magazines. The NYSE then began a widespread educational campaign to increase public
participation in the securities markets. By the end of the 1950s almost twice as many
Americans owned stocks. In response to increased trading volume, the number of stock
brokers and investment bankers doubled between 1950 and 1960 (Geisst 2004). By 1999,
the census had almost 80 million Americans directly owning stock, and millions more
invested through various retirement plans and mutual funds, representing almost 40% of the
US adult population. The average trading volume had increased to over 800 million shares
per day (Geisst 2000). In addition, investment advice became popular in the media.
Currently, the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and Business Week are well recognized titles
among the dozens of daily, weekly, and monthly magazines and periodicals that focus on
investments and investing advice. CNN, MSNBC, and the Bloomberg Network all
represent cable news channels that include large chunks of programming dedicated to
investor news.
When individual retirement accounts (IRAs) were developed in 1981, mutual funds
benefited from persons seeking long-term investments with lower risks. Now, mutual funds
are also commonly purchased in 401 k and other employee retirement accounts. In 2003,
mutual funds comprised almost a quarter, or approximately US $3 trillion dollars of the
American retirement asset market. Retirement accounts also accounted for 36.4% of mutual
fund assets (Sterngold 1994). The popularity of IRAs and the use of mutual funds as a
compatible investment vehicle greatly increased the amount of money invested in the
industry.
When the Investment Company Act of 1940, the major legislation regulating mutual
funds, was passed there were 68 mutual fund companies and approximately US $450
million from almost 300,000 investors (Potts 1972). Now there is over US $7 trillion
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invested in mutual funds. In 2003, 91 million individuals in 53 million households owned
mutual funds. This represented almost half of the households in the United States, and is
twice the percentage of households that owned mutual funds in 1990, and more than eight
times the percentage that owned mutual funds in 1980 (Sterngold 1994).
While growth may not be an actual “structure,” rapid growth in the mutual fund industry
contributed to the scandal by giving offenders a larger pool of investments from which to
skim. Without as many investors in mutual funds, the negative effects of market timers and
late traders would have been more apparent and mutual funds would have performed worse,
potentially drawing away more long-term investors and further magnifying the negative
effect on the performance and reputation of the mutual fund industry.
Transparency
The lack of transparency between brokerage firms and mutual fund companies allowed
market timing investors to hide their practices from the mutual funds. During the scandal,
brokerage firms could hold clients’ mutual fund investments in omnibus accounts. This
made it difficult for mutual funds to determine exactly which customers were making trades
and thus ferret out who was engaging in market timing. Anonymity allowed investors to
conduct illegal trades without fear of detection. In the odd cases where market timing and
late trading were detected and perpetrators identified, market timers were often able to use
their broker to open up new accounts and break up large trades into multiple smaller trades
that did not appear on fund companies’ radars. This allowed the practices to continue
unpunished, while mutual funds ineffectively chased offenders (Henriques 2004). The lack
of transparency between the two organizations made collusion between brokers and
investors a virtually unstoppable market timing and late trading force.
As an example of this collusion, the case against Prudential centered on four brokers in
the company’s New York offices who concocted an elaborate plan to execute up to a 1,000
trades a day for their hedge fund clients by disguising the origin of the trades. Regulators
found more than 25,000 emails between 68 different mutual fund companies and Prudential
over a 12-month period, asking that Prudential stop these abusive practices (Henriques
2003). The brokers from Prudential tried to avoid detection by creating new accounts from
which to trade and splitting large trades into multiple smaller trades. In addition to a
company fine, the SEC sued the four brokers involved. They now face several potential
punishments including: fines, returns of any profits made from the abusive trades, and bans
from the securities industry (Thomas 2006).
The SEC has attempted to address the lack of transparency through regulation. Part of
the newly passed rule 22c-2 allows mutual funds to obtain more information about
investors’ transactions. The rule also removed brokerage firms’ ability to use omnibus
accounts for mutual fund investments. It further required that brokerage firms provide
information on which clients are making trades. The brokerage must also agree to follow
the mutual fund’s instructions to restrict or prohibit any shareholder’s future purchases or
exchanges if that shareholder violates the fund’s market timing policies (NYSE 2008).
Competitive Environment
The competitiveness of the mutual fund industry also played a role in encouraging illegal
behavior. This substantiates the findings of Wheeler and Rothman (1982) that competitive
markets are more likely to engage in fraud—although they incorrectly predicted that
perpetrators would be small and on the industry’s fringe. The increase in investors has been
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coupled with an increase in mutual fund companies. Fund managers’ successes and failures
are tracked and displayed month to month. The successful mutual fund manager has even
become a bit of a celebrity. They are regularly featured in newspapers, magazines, and on
television shows. The “hot fund manager” may even be asked to share insights with the
investing public. This change in the environment, plus the ability to make tremendous
profits, lures fund managers to seek out institutional investors that can quickly boost a
fund’s “assets under management.” The same is true, perhaps more so, for brokers who gain
less fame, but receive more direct financial benefit from commissions when they gain new,
wealthy clients. In this situation, institutional investors can have bargaining power and
potentially can negotiate for the “best deal” (Elkind 2004). This creates an environment
where a few large hedge funds and other major investors possess tremendous power while
facing significantly less regulation than the mutual funds and brokers with whom they are
doing business. In the recent scandals this resulted in collusion in conducting illegal trades.
This change in the investing environment is borne out in demographic studies of the
stock market. In a 1960 New York Stock Exchange study, institutions and intermediaries
were responsible for only 24% of total share volume and just 29% of the corresponding
dollar value, with individual investors doing the most trading. During the first 6 months of
1969, institutional customers had substantially increased their activity, accounting for 41%
of the share volume and almost 46% of the dollar value. The individual investor's impact,
on the other hand, declined from nearly 53% of the total share volume in 1960 to only 35%
in 1969. By 1976 institutions and their intermediaries accounted for just fewer than 45% of
the total shares traded on the NYSE. However, their proportion of the corresponding dollar
value climbed to 55%. Trading by NYSE member firms for their own accounts fell to 22%
(NYSE 2008). Individuals increased their share proportion somewhat but maintained the
same level in terms of dollar value.
On 1 May 1975 brokerage commissions were deregulated and the fixed rates that had
existed since the stock market’s beginning were eliminated (Geisst 2004). Liberalization
brought about discount brokerage houses that are now commonplace in the United States.
Discount brokerage houses offer less advice and stock research than full-service brokerage
firms. With reduced services and no floor for commissions, discount brokerages can offer
lower prices for conducting securities’ transactions. More than 100 discount brokerage
firms have a growing share of the US market. The largest discount broker, Charles Schwab,
enjoyed a net revenue of US $4.3 billion in 2006, which is approximately one-eighth of
Merrill Lynch’s net revenue over the same period. This occurred despite the fact that Merrill
Lynch has been established for over 90 years, offers many more products and services,
including lending and investment banking, and has almost five times as many employees as
Charles Schwab (Charles Schwab 2006; Merrill Lynch 2006). The exact impact that
discount brokerages have had on the industry may be difficult to measure, but the most
obvious sign is that full-service brokers have begun to compete with the discount firms,
offering on-line trading and reduced commissions for reduced services.
Conflicts of Interest
The lack of independence between a mutual fund’s chair and its board of directors is a
major structural factor in the proliferation of trading abuses. Several attempts have been
made to address the issue through regulation (Damato and Burns 2004). A mutual fund
company can sell different mutual funds, and many chairmen and board members of one
fund manage other funds within the same company. This creates a conflict of interest
between the board members’ duty to protect shareholders’ rights and their desire to make
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money for the company, not to mention the cronyism and quid pro quo agreements that may
occur with the board of directors.
Critics of reform on this issue point out that mutual fund companies like Fidelity and
T. Rowe Price, who did not have independent chairmen, were found not to have been
part of the market timing and late trading scandals (Solomon and Hechinger 2004). In
addition, some funds involved in the scandal, such as Putnam Investments, had
independent chairmen. This position has been countered by outside research, “[F]unds
that have lower expense ratios and more outside directors have responded more
aggressively to the arbitrage issue, implying that fund governance is an important
determinant in how and whether funds respond to the arbitrage issue (SEC 2007)”. A
senior mutual fund analyst for the financial publication Morningstar supported this
finding, saying, “We can count on one hand the number of instances in which a fund’s
board has stood up to the adviser and said, in essence, ‘You’re fired’ (Lutton 2007).” This
seems to indicate that an independent chairperson and board of directors do not
necessarily eliminate opportunities for fraud nor does the absence of an independent chair
and board guarantee that fraud will occur. However, independent actors who have a
responsibility to protect shareholders’ interest may help reduce the likelihood that fraud
occurs within the organization.
In addition to requiring an independent chairperson, the SEC has considered mandating
that 75% of the directors of the board also be independent. Currently, the 1940 Securities
Act requires that only 40% of the directors of the board be independent from the fund-
management company (Damato and Burns 2004).
Traditions of Commerce
One of Needleman and Needleman’s (1979) original findings was that “traditions of
commerce” helped create a crime-facilitative environment in the securities industry.
Traditions of commerce refer to industry-wide practices or policies that are used in the
course of business despite being outdated. The practices and policies are embedded in the
industry’s history and competitive structure and continue despite the industry’s ability to
otherwise perform more efficiently (Needleman and Needleman 1979). In Needleman and
Needleman’s study of securities fraud, they found that paper certificates used to represent
the customer’s purchase but that their desire to have a “tangible asset” was inefficient and a
waste of resources. The second tradition was the trust that bankers automatically gave to
clients and other bankers without conducting the necessary background checks to verify
information. This tradition allowed con men to use the bankers’ trust against them to
defraud their institutions.
Traditions of commerce may be especially relevant to mutual fund fraud, as once-a-day
pricing and use of order tickets are archaic traditions that are no longer necessary in a
modern system. These processes exist despite current technology which could eliminate
many opportunities for late-trading. Order tickets and a time-stamping system are
vulnerable to manipulation, as seen during the mutual fund scandal. Brokers who had
access to the time stamping machine could manually tamper with it and backdate orders.
Also, as previously mentioned, orders that do not benefit the investor can be discarded by
colluding brokers. An electronic system that automatically sent orders to clearinghouses to
be processed as well as a paper version of the order ticket as a back-up would solve several
problems and improve efficiency in the current system. Once-a-day pricing is no longer
necessary given computers that can instantly track prices regardless of market volatility and
investment changes made by mutual fund managers.
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Japan’s Commonalities with the US
Big Bang De-Regulation
America strongly influenced Japanese rebuilding after World War II. This influence carried
over to Japanese financial regulation with the installation of American, post-Great
Depression style regulations (Malcolm 2001). These regulations separated the functions
of banking and securities firms, not allowing one company to perform both duties. The
1990s saw Japan begin to remove some of these rules3. In 1993 the Financial Systems
Reform Act removed the barriers between banks and securities firms in order to promote
competition (Hamao and Hoshi 2000).
In the late 1990s Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto introduced the “Big Bang”
initiative, which sought to reform and de-regulate six areas of the Japanese economy. This
was adopted to boost the Japanese economy by bringing more business to the Tokyo
securities market. Tokyo markets had lost favor with investors after Britain and the United
States deregulated their financial industries, allowing the London and New York markets to
offer advantages to investors through relaxed rules (Toya 2006).
The notion behind this type of mass de-regulation takes its inspiration from astrophysics
as the “Big Bang” was a large, singular event that recreated the universe. In this case,
deregulation of the financial markets was designed to recreate the Japanese “economic
universe.” However, this idea was not original. Great Britain passed the Financial Services
Act of 1986, which also was referred to as the “Big Bang.” This piece of legislation
removed fixed commissions among London’s securities market so that competition could
lower commissions and, therefore, reduce prices for consumers. The goal of the legislation
was to recapture business that had been lost to the NYSE after the United States had
removed fixed commission rates in 1975. Ironically, removal of fixed commissions was
never intended for average investors, but rather was aimed at institutional investors (Geisst
1993). Even at that time, institutional investors were prioritized over individual investors.
The Japanese viewed the success of Britain’s Big Bang deregulation and followed suit,
making themselves more competitive in the international securities markets.
The idea that Big Bang deregulation could lead to a Japanese financial scandal is ironic
because, in addition to the need to compete in international financial markets, widespread
corruption and scandal in the financial sector was one of the reasons that Japan decided to
reform the financial industry (Hall 1998). The number of scandals and the extent of damage
done in Japan between 1980 and 1996 required changes to be made; however, reform only
changes practices, it does not necessarily create a problem-free environment.
Part of Hashimoto’s deregulatory plan affected the Japanese version of the mutual fund
market, known as an investment trust. The reform included a liberalization of laws
regarding who could sell these investments. The Japanese government previously required
that any seller of investment trusts be licensed, and only brokers were allowed to apply for
these licenses. In addition, there were restrictions on the ability of non-banks to conduct
foreign business. After the Big Bang initiative, the license requirement was changed to a
simple registration with an approval system that applied only for derivatives, underwriting,
and other areas with higher risks (Hall 1998). Investment trust companies were able to sell
directly and the Japanese had more avenues to invest in foreign markets (Toya 2006). In
3 By that time the United States had also removed the post-Great Depression regulations. The Garn-St.
Germain Act, for example, ended Great Depression era regulation of the Savings and Loan industry. The act
was named as a contributing factor in the Savings and Loan crisis (Black 2004; Pontell 2004).
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2001, banks were permitted to sell investment trusts or lease office space to investment trust
management companies that wanted to sell directly to the public. Securities companies were
also able to engage in any area of securities-related activities that they wished (Hall 1998).
This type of de-regulation increases competition for brokerage firms who must try to create
relationships with investors who now have more options for investing. The brokerage firms
also faced a reduced profit margin because Big Bang deregulation removed any price floors
on brokerage commissions. While economic theory posits that increased competition is
positive, William Black’s work on control fraud indicates that such economic theories do
not consider the increased likelihood of fraud being committed in these environments
(Black 2005). As shown in the American mutual fund scandal, increased competition
among sellers gave institutional buyers leverage to negotiate for the rights to trade illegally.
Big Bang de-regulation of the investment trust industry was designed to increase
transparency and enhance their system of regulation, which is generally valuable to the
investor. However, Japanese investment trusts have a poor history of transparency. In 1994,
the New York Times noted that Japanese investment trusts do not indicate their investment
philosophies, which securities they own, past performance, or the name of their fund
manager (Sterngold 1994). This makes it difficult for investors to differentiate among
investment trusts and reach an informed investment decision. Steps toward transparency in
the financial sector can help the Japanese, but when investors do not have access to basic
information, how can they trust their investment? This lack of information gives mutual
funds the ability to abuse investors without their knowledge.
The lack of valid financial information also has been identified in other Japanese frauds
such as the Seibu, Livedoor, and Kanebo cases. In the Seibu case, it was discovered that the
company had falsified reports to the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the previous 50 years (The
Japan Times 2004). The improvements listed within the Big Bang plan are likely to upgrade
the previous system in terms of preventing fraud, but the rules regarding information
disclosure, external audits, conflicts of interest, market manipulation, surveillance and
enforcement, and mingling of funds are either vague in their calls for “improvement” or
“broadening,” or they are attempts to finally meet international standards (Hall 1998).
The liberalization of brokerage commissions in Japan has increased the opportunity for
mutual fund abuse in two different manners. The direct effect is lower commissions and
greater ability to conduct trades, since the act is less cost-prohibitive. This is especially
relevant to traders, such as market timers, who conduct many trades over a short period of
time. The indirect effect is increased competition from an influx of discount brokerage
firms. Deregulating commission may increase the brokerage firms’ desire to collaborate
with investors as the firms seek to maintain profits in the face of increased competition.
In addition, banks have been granted the ability to sell their own investment trusts.
Currently, all major banks have launched direct investment trust sales, with a minimum
investment of 10 million yen. This increased access makes the investment trust available to
the majority of the public and will likely increase their popularity as an investment vehicle
(Malcolm 2001). This further enhances competition as more mutual funds compete for
investors.
Japanese Business Culture
The Japanese business culture creates unique opportunities for white-collar criminals. In the
United States, the mutual fund scandal, Enron, and other large corporate and financial
frauds have been exposed by whistleblowers from inside the organizations. A major study
by Hamilton and Sanders (1996) noted that the Japanese were significantly less likely than
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Americans to agree that a person “should not keep silent when you see a fellow employee
do something seriously wrong at work.” This strong adherence to conformist social mores
and business hierarchies reduces the chance that a Japanese whistleblower will expose a
scandal. As noted by Pontell and Geis (2007), Japanese social norms help reduce certain
types of crime, but they may increase the likelihood of white-collar crime.
While the US, Britain, and Japan all have been part of large deregulatory movements,
the primary difference between the American and British experiences and the Japanese
experience has been the ability to recognize crises and re-regulate when scandals are
discovered. The 1929 and 1987 stock market crashes were both met with regulations
designed to prevent such disasters from re-occurring. Similar measures were taken after the
Savings and Loan and Insider Trading scandals of the 1980s. The US also recently saw the
largest corporate regulatory legislation in almost 70 years, when the Sarbanes Oxley
reforms were passed in 2002. Similarly, Britain enacted the Banking Act of 1987 to
eliminate some of the causes of the Johnson Matthey bank crisis, which forced that
institution to go bankrupt (Geisst 1993). An inability to compensate for regulatory failures
puts the Japanese economic system at significant risk for implosion, as evidenced by the
1997 Japanese banking collapse. The causes of the scandal were never fully addressed,
which prolonged the resulting economic damage (Black 2004).
One cultural factor that may limit some of the potential for investment trust abuse is the
Japanese investment strategy. While American investors are focused solely on financial
objectives, Japanese investors establish relationships and give themselves monetary
insurance through their investments (Ide 1998). While the influx of foreign investors
seeking quick financial gain in a deregulated Japan may create opportunities for abuse, it
seems unlikely that these abuses will come from domestic investors with relational, long-
term objectives.
Another aspect that may aid Japan is the tendency to deregulate slowly. When the barrier
between banks and securities firms was lifted in 1993, the Ministry of Finance maintained
control over which firms received licenses to conduct both types of transactions. During the
1st year under the deregulated system, only five firms were approved to expand their
business operations (Hamao and Hoshi 2000). This is in contrast to the American approach
to deregulation in which any deregulatory measure is typically met with a flurry of activity,
as organizations rush to take advantage of new opportunities. This was evident when the
Glass-Steagall Act was removed, allowing for banks to conduct securities transactions.
Banks had been anticipating the removal of the act for months before it happened, and
some already had a plan in place to begin such transactions the 1st day they were allowed.
The same occurred for discount brokerage firms, with several going into business on 1 May
1975, the day that broker commissions were deregulated.
Prospects for the Future
Financial fraud may always occur on some scale, but the problem becomes more significant
when it is endemic to a system. The issues salient in the American mutual fund scandal may
easily be magnified in the Japanese case, given a similar competitive environment and less
transparency and ability to recognize and address the problem. These factors, combined
with the Japanese culture of greater adherence to social and business hierarchies, even when
illegalities are involved, decreases the likelihood of early discovery of fraud. This helps
create a crime-facilitative environment similar to the one that characterized the American
mutual fund scandal. A reduced risk of detection in Japan could lead to more damage over a
longer period of time than was seen in the United States. On the other hand, the lack of a
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large pool of funds from which to skim may keep abusive investors away from a vulnerable
industry. If, and when, the Japanese mutual fund market begins to exhibit large growth;
however, one would expect to see abuses similar to those found in the American mutual
fund scandal.
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Appendix 1
Mutual fund transaction:
Investor Broker-dealer Order-ticket with time-stamp
Wired to clearing house or handled internally Net orders sent to mutual fund
Step 1: The investor places an order with the broker-dealer to buy or sell the mutual fund.
Step 2: The broker-dealer records the order and an order ticket with a time-stamp is
recorded.
Step 3: The order is then wired to a clearinghouse to be processed, or the order is
processed within the brokerage firm’s clearing division.
Step 4: The net orders are then sent along to the mutual fund company to be processed.
Late trading transaction:
The diagram is the same, but the steps are different.
Step 1: The investor places an order with the broker-dealer to buy or sell the mutual fund
after the market has closed.
Step 2: The broker-dealer records the order and an order ticket with a fraudulent time-
stamp is recorded.
Step 3: If the news is in the investor’s favor, the order is then wired to a clearinghouse to
be processed, or the order is processed within the brokerage firm’s clearing
division. If the news is against the investor, then the order is not processed.
Step 4: The net orders are then sent along to the mutual fund company to be processed.
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